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Abstract 
We report estimates of the fiscal multiplier for interwar Britain based on quarterly data, 
time-series econometrics, and ‘defense news’.  We find that the government expenditure 
multiplier was in the range 0.3 to 0.8, much lower than previous estimates.  The scope for a 
Keynesian solution to recession was less than is generally supposed.  We find that 
rearmament gave a smaller boost to real GDP than previously claimed.   Rearmament may, 
however, have had a larger impact than a temporary public works program of similar 
magnitude if private investment anticipated the need to add capacity to cope with future 
defense spending. 
Keywords: defense news; multiplier; public works; rearmament 
JEL Classification:  E62; N14 
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Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2008/9 and the difficulties in escaping from recession since the crisis 
have re-awakened interest in Keynesian economic policies.  This suggests that the time is 
right for a reappraisal of the British experience in the 1930s.  This is a period with 
considerable relevance for today, in particular because after 1932 nominal interest rates 
were very low both during an initial phase of fiscal consolidation and a later one of 
rearmament financed partly by borrowing.  More generally, much of the interwar period 
saw considerable slack in the British economy.  The size of the fiscal multiplier in such 
conditions is of obvious interest to today’s policymakers, just as it has been to economic 
historians working on the macroeconomics of interwar Britain. 
The British experience of downturn and recovery is reported in Table 1.  A fall in GDP, which 
was very modest compared with the United States, was followed by a strong recovery in the 
years after 1933.  Before 1935, insofar as this recovery was the result of policy, it had to 
come from monetary stimulus.  Fiscal policy only began to play a role after 1935 when 
rearmament provided a de-facto Keynesian stimulus. 
It has been a widely-held belief among British economic historians that rearmament 
delivered a powerful stimulus in the late 1930s (Robertson, 1983, p. 280).  In taking this 
position they echo the comment of The Economist of 22 April 1939 that “Britain’s 
rearmament programme is the greatest public works programme ever devised in time of 
formal peace”.  A paper by Mark Thomas (1983) is the only serious attempt to quantify the 
impact of rearmament on economic activity.  His method was based on an input-output 
table and a social accounting matrix and he found that the multiplier was 1.64 in 1935 and 
1.60 in 1938.  This generated an estimate that rearmament produced over a million jobs by 
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1938 by which time the increase of £204 million in defense expenditure since 1934 would 
have raised GDP by £326 million or 6.5 per cent.  As Roger Middleton has noted in a recent 
literature survey, Thomas’s results have been much cited and provide “a quantitative 
demonstration that at least military Keynesianism worked” (2011, p. 14). 
Thomas’s finding that the government-expenditure multiplier was about 1.6 is within the 
range of 1.25 to 1.75 thought plausible by Timothy Hatton (1987) in an influential review of 
estimates made in the 1980s which still comprise almost all the literature available today.  
Even so, this estimate may not be reliable since it assumes away any crowding out and may 
therefore be too large leading to an exaggeration of the impact of rearmament.  Much of 
the historiography focuses on the possible impact of public expenditure proposals to reduce 
unemployment made by John Maynard Keynes and Hubert Henderson.  These proposals 
were taken up by the Liberal Party under David Lloyd George at the 1929 general election. T. 
Thomas (1981) estimated the government-expenditure multiplier to be 0.98 in the short-run 
and 1.44 in the long-run using a simulation of a Keynesian macro-econometric model. 
Stephen Broadberry’s (1986) estimation of an IS-LM model gave a value of 1.22 for the fiscal 
multiplier. More recently, Nicholas Dimsdale and Nicholas Horsewood (1995) incorporated 
aggregate supply with a high degree of nominal inertia as well as aggregate demand into a 
macro-econometric model for the interwar period.  They, conclude that the short run 
multiplier was about 1.5 and the long run as much as 2.5.  All of these authors explicitly or 
implicitly conclude that the impact of government expenditure on employment would have 
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been considerably lower than claimed by Keynes and Henderson.  Low enough that that 
Lloyd George ‘could not have done it’.1  
The methods employed in these papers to obtain estimates of the multiplier are open to 
challenge and are not those which would be used by macroeconomists today.  The models 
they rely upon basically embody Keynesian ideas in their specification with a traditional 
consumption function and may not adequately reflect crowding out, with the implication 
that the estimated multipliers are too large.  For example, models in either the modern 
neoclassical or new Keynesian traditions which embody optimizing behavior by forward-
looking households typically expect consumer expenditure to fall rather than increase in 
response to an increase in government expenditure - in other words: the multiplier may be 
less than 1.2  If these models of a more recent vintage were applicable to the 1930s, then 
the strong likelihood is that the conventional wisdom that rearmament had a big impact on 
GDP would be incorrect.  This suggests that a fresh look at the size of the multiplier in 1930s’ 
Britain using modern techniques is desirable. 
Given that theoretical predictions are model-dependent it is important to let the data speak 
and, since the seminal paper by Olivier Blanchard and Roberto Perotti (2002), vector 
autoregression (VAR) techniques have often been used to estimate multipliers from 
quarterly macroeconomic time series, although many economists prefer to base their ideas 
of the value of the multiplier on the results of calibrations of dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) models, where an interesting aspect is how far these may vary according 
                                                          
1
 This is a reference to the title of the pamphlet published by Keynes and Henderson, Can Lloyd George Do It? 
This claimed that a public works program of £100 million for 3 year would reduce unemployment by 500,000, a 
claim that quantitative economic historians reject. 
2
 For a convenient summary of predictions from a variety of macroeconomic models see Hebous (2011). 
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to the state of the economy.3  The big problem in estimating multipliers using VARs is the 
validity of the identification assumptions that are made, in particular whether government 
expenditure can be treated as exogenous and unanticipated.4  It is fair to say that the use of 
these techniques has produced quite a wide range of estimates of the size of the 
government-expenditure multiplier (ΔY/ΔG) for the post-war American economy, with a 
recent authoritative survey concluding that it probably lies between 0.8 and 1.5.5 
Building a convincing DSGE model for the interwar British economy would be an ambitious 
undertaking.  However, it is now possible to revisit the question of the size of the fiscal 
multiplier using time-series econometrics rather than relying on a traditional 
macroeconomic model, as has been the practise hitherto, thanks to the development of a 
quarterly series for real GDP for the interwar UK economy by James Mitchell, Solomos 
Solomou and Martin Weale (2012).6  This is our focus.  In undertaking this task, we make use 
of Valerie Ramey’s approach to resolving the endogeneity of government expenditure using 
announcements of new expenditures (2011a).  She argues for the use of changes in the 
present value of expected future defense spending and both she and Robert Barro and 
Charles Redlick (2011) have implemented this approach in recent papers.  Their estimates of 
the multiplier vary a bit according to the sample period used but for the postwar era both 
papers suggest a range of 0.6 to 0.8. We construct a defense-news variable from 
contemporary sources and develop a similar analysis to estimate ΔY/ΔG for interwar Britain.  
                                                          
3
 For a recent example of a DSGE model where the multiplier is much higher when nominal interest rates are 
at the lower bound because fiscal stimulus lowers real interest rates, see Christiano et al. (2011). 
4
 See the discussion in Ramey (2011b). 
5
 Ibid., p. 683; i.e., an increase of $100 in government spending raises GDP by between $80 and $150 
depending on which estimate one prefers. 
6
 These estimates are derived using data on annual GDP, quarterly industrial production and monthly 
economic indicators published in The Economist.  An econometric technique is then deployed to obtain 
monthly GDP from these ingredients.  The approach does not provide estimates of the components of national 
expenditure. 
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We use the results to provide a reappraisal of the claims in the historiography relating to the 
possible impact on real GDP both of the hypothetical Lloyd George fiscal stimulus, or ‘the 
Keynesian solution’, and of the actual rearmament program. 
1. Defense News 
The aim of ‘Defense News’ is to reflect changes to planned government defense 
expenditure previously unanticipated by the public.  More precisely, the aim is to chronicle 
changes in the information set available to an informed member of the public and calculate 
their implications for the expected present value of future defense expenditure. This 
variable can be thought of as capturing exogenous shocks to a key component of 
government spending.   
The series for changes in the expected present value of government expenditure on defense 
for the United Kingdom in the interwar period has been constructed using a similar method 
to that employed by Ramey (2009) who mainly used information from Business Week.7  Our 
key source is The Economist magazine, which was published weekly through the interwar 
period.  This source gives details of defense estimates, which were usually published in 
government papers in February and March each year, but there were sometimes also 
supplementary estimates.  The Economist gave a detailed yearly account of actual spending 
at the time of the annual budget in April. It also published quarterly running totals at the 
beginning of January, April, July and October each year, and from time to time provided 
commentary on the prospects for defense spending in editorials and in featured news items. 
In order to construct the series for ‘Defense News’, we examined every issue of The 
Economist from 1919 through 1938 and compiled a complete log of all entries relating to 
                                                          
7
 The estimates made there are used in Ramey (2011a) for her method of estimating the fiscal multiplier. 
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defense expenditure.  The relevant material includes reports of defense estimates, 
announcements of policy changes with possible spending implications, special reports such 
as those on air-force and naval expenditure in February 1936, commentaries on the 
credibility of government estimates and announcements, and predictions of future 
developments.  Most of these items lend themselves to straightforward quantification.  
Wherever The Economist provides a clear indication as to its expectation of the likely course 
of future defense expenditure we have accepted that as part of the public’s information set.  
The volume of material varies considerably over the years; for example, there are many 
entries for the late 1930s but few for the late 1920s.  Statistical information obtained from 
The Economist has been cross-checked against the detailed descriptions of British budgets 
provided by Bernard Mallet and Oswald George (1929, 1933) and by Basil Sabine (1970).  
Using the log we made an estimate of the present discounted value of defense expenditure 
for 1920 quarter1 and then updated it each quarter until 1938 quarter 4.  In moving forward 
through time, for each quarter we compiled a present value figure based on the information 
set available in the previous quarter and one using the current information. The difference 
between the two estimates is ‘Defense News’ for the quarter.  Expected values were 
calculated at 1938 prices for a horizon of five years using a discount rate of 5.1 per cent.8  
Much of the time there was no news, i.e., the information set was the same as in the 
previous quarter. Estimates of ‘Defense News’ are reported in Table 2.   
We rely on the major historical studies of military policy, such as those of John Ferris (1989) 
and George Peden (1979), to interpret the commentary of The Economist.  The former fills 
                                                          
8
 Figures in current prices have been converted to constant 1938 prices using the monthly retail price index in 
Capie and Collins (1983, Table 2.13) and the discount rate is 1.25% per quarter.  We have experimented with 
several other values reflecting rates on government bonds in different years and found that the ‘Defense 
News’ series and the multiplier estimates are not sensitive to this choice. 
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in valuable background on the ‘Ten-Year Rule’ (see below) and the latter reports archival 
information that bears out some claims relating to rearmament made by The Economist.  
Indeed, the main difficulty in constructing the Defense News series concerns the period 
after the policy of rearmament was announced in the 1935 Defense White Paper (Cmd. 
4827).  The White Paper made clear that there would be substantial additional defense 
expenditure in future but offered no details as to magnitudes or timing.  
A full discussion of how the ‘Defense News’ variable was constructed can be found 
elsewhere (Crafts, 2012).  Here we provide some context and briefly discuss the two 
episodes which require careful interpretation because government policy was in flux. 
The interwar period started with fiscal consolidation following the explosion of the public 
debt during and immediately after World War I; for defense this meant disarmament.  In 
1919, the government set out its view that ‘normal expenditure’ on the fighting forces 
would be £93.5 million per year (BPP, 1919).9  The plan was based on the assumption that 
no expeditionary force would be required for a great war in the next decade: the ’10-Year 
Rule’.  The interpretation of this rule was, however, disputed in budget planning discussions, 
with each service arguing that it had to be ready for a major conflict by 1929 while the 
Treasury wanted to delay the start of such preparations until 1929 at the earliest.  The 
struggle between the Treasury and the armed forces lasted until 1927, when spending 
reached a steady-state level of £108 million.10 
The second phase covers the period from 1927 through 1934.  Until 1932, defense policy 
was quite settled but then the 10-Year Rule was cancelled in March following the invasion of 
                                                          
9
 All figures for defense spending have been converted to 1938 prices.  Fiscal years then, as now, began in April 
each year. 
10
 The dispute between the Treasury and the armed forces over the interpretation of the 10-year rule is 
reviewed in Ferris (1989). 
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Manchuria and the attack on Shanghai by Japan.  The next 3 years show modest increases in 
defense expenditure related first to a new naval construction program in 1933 and then to 
new squadrons for the air force in 1934. Already in 1932, Neville Chamberlain (Chancellor of 
the Exchequer) was contemplating a rise of defense expenditure of a further 10 per cent by 
1935 (Peden, 1979, p. 67).  In 1934/35, defense expenditure was £124.7 million. 
The third phase was rearmament.  The new policy was announced, but with no spending 
commitments, in the Defense White Paper of March 1935 (BPP, 1935).  This statement 
simply said that additional expenditure on the armaments of the defense services could no 
longer safely be postponed.  In late 1935, the Cabinet agreed a total program of £1075 
million over the period 1936-40 (Peden, 1979, p. 77).  The pace of rearmament was further 
intensified when the Defense White Paper of February 1937 (BPP, 1937) stated that it would 
be imprudent to contemplate total expenditure of less than £1500 million over the next five 
years, while expenditure over the next two or three years would be greatly increased.  This 
announcement of a greatly enhanced military build-up was accompanied by the Defense 
Loans Act, which gave specific approval for £400 million of this to be financed by borrowing.  
Finally, in the run up to and immediate aftermath of the Budget of 1938 it became clear that 
spending would be ahead even of the 1937 program at least during the two years 1938/9 
and 1939/40. 
The first period that deserves some comment covers 1920 to 1922.  This includes the 
episode of the Geddes Committee, appointed in August 1921 to advise the government on 
spending cuts, which published its report in February 1922.  The prelude to this committee 
was a big Supplementary Estimate in December 1920 and then a full year Defense Estimate 
of £138.7 million in April 1921, which showed that the ‘normal year’ of £93.5 million would 
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not be achieved in 1921/22.  The Geddes Committee was established with a mandate to 
propose budget cuts of £100 million at current prices.  At the time, The Economist predicted 
that defense would bear the brunt and that the government would shrink from 
implementing the full amount of the cuts.  It turned out that the Geddes proposal of a 
defense cut of £58.5 million was scaled back to £38 million. 
These developments are reflected in the ‘Defense News’ estimates reported in Table 2.  We 
assume that the extra defense spending announced in early December 1920 is new 
information for the public in 1920 quarter 4.  The Christmas Day issue of The Economist in 
1920 forecast very accurately the Defense Estimate for 1921/22 so we assume that, in 
effect, this became known to the public for the first time at the start of 1921 quarter 1.  At 
the same time, given the weak state of public finances with the large public debt overhang 
from World War I, it was clear that the Treasury could not afford to allow this extra military 
spending to become permanent, so we assume that the ‘normal year’ was regarded by the 
public as postponed but not indefinitely, and we take the subsequent establishment of the 
Geddes Committee as support for this view.  Given that the outcome of the Geddes 
Committee deliberations was basically predicted by The Economist, we assume that well-
informed agents would have received this news at its inception in 1921 quarter 3 rather 
than 1922 quarter 1.11  In making these estimates of ‘Defense News’, we have, of course, 
made assumptions but have primarily relied on changes in the information available to the 
public as reflected in spending announcements and commentary on them by The Economist.   
The second period to be reviewed covers the move to rearmament during the years 1935 to 
1937.  In the last year before the new policy of rearmament, 1934/5, defense expenditure 
                                                          
11
 Details of the calculations of changes in the expected present value of defence expenditure are reported in 
Crafts (2012). 
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was £124.7 million.  Following the publication of the 1935 White Paper, the April 1935 
Budget confirmed that defense spending in 1935/6 was expected to be £136 million. 
However, The Economist of 5 October, 1935 reported that spending in quarter 3 had 
exceeded that of the same period in the previous year by 31 per cent and the outturn for 
1935/6 was eventually £148.7 million.  During February and March 1936, The Economist ran 
a series of editorials and special reports which suggested that expectations of future 
defense spending should be greatly increased.  The Defense Estimate for 1936/7 was £167.7 
million but the 1936 Defense White Paper, published on March 3, indicated that the 
government had plans of unspecified cost for major re-equipment of all three armed forces, 
which The Economist (March 7 and 14) suggested would imply additional defense 
expenditure of at least £25 million and possibly £40 million or even £80 million, during 
1936/7.  On 28 November, 1936, The Economist reported on a brokers’ circular which 
predicted that the Defense Estimate for 1937/8 would be £220 million and described this as 
‘not prima facie unreasonable’.  On 20 February, 1937, The Economist noted that the 
Defense White Paper expected defense spending of at least £1500 million over 5 years and 
on 24 April, 1937 reported that defense spending in 1937/8 was expected to be £278.3 
million, of which £80 million would be met by borrowing. 
These developments inform the large values for ‘Defense News’ for 1935Q2, 1936Q1 and 
1937Q1 in Table 2.  We assume that by 1935 quarter 2 the public expected a substantial and 
sustained increase in defense expenditure.  Given that The Economist of 16 March, 1935 
commented that the White Paper implied that in future spending would show a big increase 
over the estimate for 1935/6, we assume that at this point the actual 1935/6 spending was 
anticipated and expected to be the normal level in future.  We believe that the public’s 
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expectations of future defense expenditure were raised again in the light of the next White 
Paper and Defense Estimates in March 1936.  The Defense Estimate for 1936/37 published 
in March 1936 was £168 million (compared with £136 million a year earlier) but a big 
supplementary estimate was generally expected, which would push expected spending to 
well over £200 million according to The Economist.  The press was, in effect, largely correctly 
anticipating what we now know the Cabinet had agreed, namely, a total program of £1075 
million over the period 1936-40 (Peden, 1979, p. 77).  We assume that at this point the 
public expected defense expenditure of £212 million per year for the next 5 years.  We also 
assume that the public’s expectations were ratcheted up again in early 1937.  Specific 
commitments were made in the Defense White Paper and the Defense Loans Act 
underpinned the credibility of this announcement.  We assume that in 1937 quarter 1 the 
public expected future expenditure to be £300 million per year through 1942 to match the 
Defense White Paper plans which The Economist of March 20 thought would be carried out. 
In Table 2, the observations for ‘Defense News’ in 1935 through 1937 are abnormally large.  
We have constructed them on the basis of a careful and thorough reading of The 
Economist.12 Nevertheless, there must have been considerable uncertainty at the time both 
about the detail of the government’s plans and the extent to which they would be 
implemented.  This could lead to downward-biased estimates of the normal government 
expenditure multiplier either because the ‘Defense News’ numbers are outliers or if they are 
unreliable.  Accordingly, in what follows we present results both for a full interwar sample 
period and also for a period truncated at 1934Q4 which omits the potentially problematic 
years at the end. 
                                                          
12
 Details of the calculations of the expected value of future defense expenditure can be found in Crafts (2012). 
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2. Econometric Modeling 
The defense news variable that we use in our econometric modeling, news, is, following 
Ramey (2011a), the series given in Table 2 divided by the one-quarter lagged value of real 
GDP; news is shown in Figure 1. We begin by employing an approach similar to that of Barro 
and Redlick (2011).13  This has the following general specification: 
 ti ititiiti it uGDPDnewsy     controls lagged
4
1 12
4
0 10
     (1) 
tD  is the level of defense spending while  1log  ttt GDPGDPy  is quarterly real GDP 
growth.  The sample period runs from the first quarter of 1922 to the end of 1938.  Starting 
in 1922 avoids the immediate aftermath of World War 1, which is known to have produced 
a shift in the process generating GDP.14  The lag length was set at 4 to model any seasonality 
present in the data (seasonally unadjusted data was used throughout). The 
contemporaneous term of news was included but all other variables were lagged to avoid 
problems of endogeneity.  The control variables included were lags of export growth, 
changes in the money multiplier, consol yields and the tax rate, and the unemployment 
rate.  Growth rates and changes were used to ameliorate problems caused by the non-
stationarity of many of the variables when expressed as levels.  The error term tu  is 
specified as the ARCH(1) process 2 110
2
 tt uu  , which effectively models the volatility of 
GDP growth during 1926 and 1927 and precludes the need for lagged values of GDP growth 
to be included as regressors: including such lags with tu  assumed to be homoskedastic leads 
                                                          
13
 These authors employed per cent changes of variables, rather than first differences of logarithms, to model 
growth rates.  Because quarterly data is used here no differences in estimates are found if per cent changes 
are used. 
14
 See, for example, Mills (1991).  
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to a significant deterioration of fit.  Figure 2 clearly shows the volatility of GDP growth in the 
boom and bust after World War 1 and during 1926 and 1927.15 
In each case we reports estimates based on a final specification, in which insignificant 
variables have been deleted (see Table 3).  For the estimated coefficients of the included 
control variables see Table A1 column (1).  Throughout we use standard errors robust to 
possible residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, all included variables are 
significant and the reported equation passes a variety of standard tests for misspecification.  
The news variable is significantly positive at lags of one and two quarters with  coefficients 
estimated to be, with one-standard error bounds, 0025.00325.0   and 0039.00179.0  . 
Barro and Redlick’s multiplier definition is based on using annual data with single lags of the 
regressors. Our quarterly counterpart   
4
1 2
4
1 1
16
i ii i
m  .  Given the estimates in 
Table 2 the multiplier is 13.045.0 m .  For the period truncated at 1934Q4, the estimated 
multiplier is 37.081.0 m . 
Since the fit of this equation is not particularly good, with an 2R of just 0.19, we tried moving 
to a more general model specification.  To this end we relate changes in output growth, 
ty , again to lags of tnews , but now to lags of government spending growth disaggregated 
into defense and non-defense spending, td  and tdnon , and lags of non-government 
spending (private expenditure on consumption, investment and net exports) growth, tn , 
all growth variables again being defined as one-quarter changes in the logarithms: 
 
t
i i itiitii itii itit
u
ndnondnewsy

       
 controls lagged
4
1
4
1 43
4
1 2
4
1 10

    (2) 
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 1926 and 1927 were affected by the General Strike and its aftermath. 
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Table 4 gives reports our estimates based on a final specification, in which insignificant 
variables have been deleted.  For the estimated coefficients of the included control 
variables see Table A1 column (2) 16  All included variables are highly significant and the 
reported equation passes a variety of standard tests for misspecification.  The news variable 
is again significantly positive at lags of one and two quarters with coefficients estimated to 
be 0044.00154.0   and 0031.00380.0  .  The sum annualized of these coefficients 
( 025.0213.0  ), may be regarded as an estimate of the ‘direct’ multiplier of defense news on 
GDP17  The second model offers a superior fit to the Barro and Redlick model, with a much 
improved 2R  of 0.46 and a regression standard error some 20% lower. 
However, there may also be ‘indirect’ effects because news may have influence on other 
various categories of spending that also matter to GDP growth.  Regressions of the form 
    
4
1
4
10 i i titiitit
vnewszz   were therefore estimated for z respectively 
defined as d , dnon  and n , these being reported in Columns (2)-(4) of Table 4.  These 
were then inserted into equation (2) to obtain a set of indirect multipliers and an overall 
multiplier, defined as the sum of the direct and indirect multipliers: the time path of the 
direct and the total overall multipliers are shown in Figure 3.  The total overall multiplier is 
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 Because the contemporaneous news regressor was found to be insignificant in (1), this was omitted from 
the specification of (2). 
17
 The reasoning behind this statement is as follows.  If defense news is denoted X, then 1 ttt GDPXnews  
and the long-run relationship between GDP growth and news is  
 
    1111 0533.00380.00154.0log   ttttttttt GDPXGDPXGDPGDPGDPGDPy  
 
so that XGDP 0533.0  is the long-run relationship. 
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then 0.34 on an annualized basis.  It is effectively reached after three years.18 For the 
truncated period ending at 1934Q4 we obtain an annualized total multiplier of 0.76.   
Two additional points are worth noting.  First, the equation in column (2) shows that 
defense news does indeed predict subsequent defense expenditure.  Second, it should be 
remembered that ending the sample period at 1934Q4 excludes the defense news data 
which are subject to relatively large margins of error.  This implies that finding a multiplier 
well below 1 is robust to excluding the largest and least certain values for defense news. 
The clear implication is that there was some crowding out of private expenditure even in a 
‘depressed economy’.  This issue can be explored using an approach recently proposed by 
Ramey (2012).  In the current context, Ramey’s equation may be specified as 
            

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where tN  and tG  are the levels of non-government (private) and government expenditure 
respectively.  This equation was estimated for both sample periods and the results are 
reported in Table 5.  Government expenditure has an overall negative effect on private 
expenditure, with the total impact estimated to be –0.23 for the full sample and –0.28 for 
the shorter sample.19  This confirms that the multiplier, ΔY/ΔG, is < 1 with implied values of 
0.77 for the full sample and 0.72 for the shorter sample. 
3. The Impact of Rearmament on GDP 
                                                          
18
 As the analytical form of the total multiplier is a highly non-linear function of the coefficients of the various 
regressions only asymptotic standard errors can be calculated via the ‘delta’ method, which may be rather 
unreliable here.  However, we conjecture that it is in the region of that calculated for the Barro-Redlick 
multiplier, i.e., in the region of 0.1 on an annualized basis. 
19
 These total impacts were calculated in the usual fashion as    
4
1 1
4
1 2
1
i ii i
 . 
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We can use our estimates of the multiplier to examine the impact of rearmament on 
economic recovery in Britain in the 1930s and compare our findings with those of the best-
known paper on this topic by Thomas (1983).  The simplest approach is to take the 
estimates of the government-expenditure multiplier obtained for the period 1922-1934 and 
apply them to the increase in defense expenditure of £204 million in 1938.  Our multiplier 
estimate of 0.8 gives a rearmament contribution of about £160 million or 3.3 per cent of 
GDP in 1938.  This is half the estimate based on Thomas’s method with a multiplier 
calculated as 1.6. 
The idea of ‘defense news’ is that it contains information relevant to private sector 
decisions.  A credible commitment to future defense spending might well stimulate 
investment by businesses to meet the anticipated demand for military equipment, 
munitions, etc.  Such investment would amount to an element of ‘crowding in’, and is an 
example of what the economics literature on the fiscal multiplier what call an anticipation 
effect.20   
Some years ago, A.J. Robertson (1983) argued that the main initial effect of rearmament 
was to encourage growth in the construction industry as armaments manufacturers 
scrambled to add capacity. Robertson drew attention to the impact of works and buildings 
expenditures in stimulating economic activity and which sustained a vigorous expansion in 
construction output even as private house-building stalled.  Robertson based this argument 
on the contribution of William Hornby (1958) to the official UK History of the Second World 
War.  Hornby details the build-up of activity to add capacity especially from 1936 onwards.  
                                                          
20
 Anticipation effects are well documented in studies of the effects of fiscal policy changes, cf., Mertens and 
Ravn (2012), and are a well-known complication in seeking to estimate multipliers as Ramey (2011b, p. 680) 
makes clear.  In the context of government expenditure, anticipation effects occur when the private sector 
spends more now not as a result of today’s government expenditure but only because future spending is 
confidently expected.  The latter is not part of the conventional multiplier concept. 
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The push included a notable surge in investment for aircraft production and the formation 
of three important new armaments manufacturing companies.  David Chambers’s recent 
compilation of data on all interwar IPOs shows that 20 of the 27 aircraft manufacturing 
ventures were launched between 1934Q3 and 1936Q2, when the increase in actual defense 
spending was still relatively small.21 
Robertson’ view suggests we can use our defense news methodology, which was really 
designed to facilitate an estimate of the multiplier, to simulate the impact of rearmament 
on GDP.  In principle, the overall multiplier time path from our preferred specification could 
be used to compute the estimated monetary impact on GDP of defense-news shocks as in 
Figure 4, which uses a five-year horizon on the basis of a multiplier of 0.34.22  The Figure 
clearly shows the rapid increase in this impact after 1934, driven by the very large defense-
news shocks starting in 1935.  Table 6 sets out in more detail the simulated impact of 
defense news on GDP during the recovery period and also reports actual defense 
expenditure.  Based on the total multiplier (including the direct and indirect components) 
for the full period, this impact averaged 5.1 per cent of GDP in 1938 and amounted to 
£246.2 million (at 1938 prices) for the four quarters.   
One must be careful not to put too much weight on these estimates because the defense 
news shocks in these years were very large.  For example, the defense news shock in 1937Q1 
is estimated as £393 million on the basis of the Defense White Paper stating that total 
defense expenditure over the next five years would be at least £1500 million.  The 1937 
announcement was huge compared with the defense news from 1922 to 1934 and 
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 See the discussion of the impact of rearmament on IPOs in Chambers (2010); additional data kindly supplied 
by the author. 
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 These impacts were computed in the following way.  If im  is the ith period overall multiplier, then Figure 3 
shows the five-year (20-quarter) impact computed as    
20
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compares with actual defense spending in 1936/7 of about half that amount (£194.6 
million).  Clearly, an impact of 5.1 per cent of GDP would entail a very substantial boost to 
investment from the anticipation effect and is perhaps best regarded as an upper bound 
estimate since the increase in investment in manufacturing sectors relevant to the war 
effort was £57.9 million (at 1938 prices), only £16.5 million more than in 1934.23  
Overall rearmament provided a significant stimulus to recovery in the late 1930s.  That said, 
the evidence points to a smaller impact than is found (or implied) by the earlier literature on 
fiscal multipliers in 1930s’ Britain.  All this suggests considerable caution before accepting 
without qualification Thomas’s often cited conclusion that “the success of rearmament in 
creating employment ... leads us to view the eschewment of fiscal policy in the thirties as a 
missed opportunity” (1983, p. 571).  Our results suggest that, if it is believed that 
rearmament had a substantial impact, this would be on the basis of the implications of 
massive future spending plans rather than because there was a large fiscal multiplier.  The 
implication is that a conventional temporary program of expenditure on public works of 
similar magnitude to the actual increase in defense spending between 1934 and 1938 would 
have had a much smaller impact on GDP than Thomas’s model seems to imply. 
4. Discussion 
Both of our econometric models imply that the government expenditure multiplier in 
interwar Britain was well below 1.  A reasonable conclusion from our estimations is that the 
government expenditure multiplier was between 0.3 and 0.8.  This is much lower than the 
estimates in the historiography reviewed earlier; these ranged between 1.2 and 2.5.  As we 
noted, however, those multipliers were not obtained using modern methods and are clearly 
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 Derived from Feinstein (1965) based on his sectors 8.21, 8.22, 8.23, 8.24, 8.25, and 8.41. 
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questionable.  On the other hand, our estimates are quite similar to those found for the 
United States using a defense-news approach. 
There are two reasons as to why the multiplier may have been quite modest even in the 
1930s.  First, new-Keynesian models predict a large multiplier when interest rates are at the 
‘zero lower bound.’  In these circumstances a deficit-financed increase in government 
spending leads expectations of inflation to increase and the stimulus comes through a fall in 
the real interest rate.  In 1930s Britain, the decline in real interest rates was far less 
dramatic than in the post-gold standard United States.24  Second, the legacy of World War I 
meant that the ratio of public debt to GDP remained above 140 per cent and peaked at 
nearly 180 per cent in 1933 (Middleton, 2010).  Economists have found that, once the level 
of government debt is over 100 per cent of GDP, the response of output to government 
spending shocks is very small even in deep recessions (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2011).  
A theoretical reason for this result is that expectations of large tax increases are high when 
the debt to GDP ratio is high (Perotti, 1999).  There seems to be stronger modern evidence 
for consumption reductions stemming from ‘Ricardian-equivalence’ offsets when the debt 
to GDP ratio is above 100 per cent (Rohn, 2010).   
As Roger Middleton (1985, ch. 8) noted, in the 1930s the balanced-budget orthodoxy was 
strong and extra government spending that threatened fiscal rectitude led to expectations 
of proximate tax increases.  Any reader of The Economist’s features on public finances and 
commentary on taxes required to balance the budget would have been painfully aware of 
the need to raise tax revenues in these circumstances and there were regular changes in 
                                                          
24
 According to estimates made by Jagjit Chadha and Nicholas Dimsdale (1999) the ex-post real long rate fell by 
a little over 3 percentage points between 1934 and 1937, whereas in the United States the fall from 1933 to 
1936 was over 11 percentage points. 
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income tax rates to this end.25  Indeed, in the debate on the budget in 1933, the Treasury 
publicly maintained that any possible expansionary effects from an unbalanced budget 
might be vitiated by expectations of future tax increases and that the strong public 
commitment to the balanced budget rule by government ministers meant that any 
suggestion of a deficit would lead to expectations of higher taxation.   
So some private-expenditure offset to increased defense spending through Ricardian 
equivalence would not seem unreasonable, especially in a highly unequal economy where 
income-tax paying classes accounted for a large share of consumption.26 The suggestion that 
news of future defense spending might work to reduce consumption through negative 
wealth effects is bolstered by Broadberry’s (1988) estimates of the aggregate consumption 
function.  He finds a significant role for wealth effects.  One should not however jump to the 
other extreme and conclude that the 1930s recovery in Britain was triggered by the 
expansionary effects of a fiscal contraction initiated to rescue teetering public finances from 
the damage of the world economic crisis.27  On the contrary, our estimates point to a 
positive fiscal multiplier, albeit smaller than those of other scholars.  They do have the nice 
property that they echo the views of the British Treasury at the time, namely, that the 
multiplier was positive but less than 1 (Middleton, 1985, p. 163). 
So where did recovery come from?  Insofar as it was stimulated by policy, the initial phase 
was based on leaving the gold standard and ‘cheap money’.  The policy stance was 
developed quite fully by late-1932.  It entailed low nominal interest rates and a commitment 
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 Sabine (1970) records that the standard rate of income tax was changed 7 times (6 up, 1 down) in the 1930s.  
Overall, it rose from 20 per cent at the start to 35 per cent at the end. 
26
 The top 20 per cent had 46 per cent of disposable income in 1937 while those paying income tax with 
incomes above £125 per year accounted for about 2/3 of consumption according to estimates by Barna (1945). 
27
 Middleton’s (2010) estimates show an increase in the constant-employment budget surplus of about 4 per 
cent of GDP between 1929/30 and 1933/34. 
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to raising the price level, underpinned by an exchange-rate target of a 25 per cent nominal 
devaluation compared with the gold-standard parity, which was enforced through 
intervention in the foreign exchange market (Howson, 1975, 1980).  In terms of the overall 
expansion of real GDP (25.8 percent between 1932Q2 and 1938Q4), our estimates indicate a 
contribution from rearmament of at most 20 per cent, building up mainly after 1935.28 
The optimism of Keynes and Henderson of the impact of a late-1920s public works program 
on unemployment has not been shared by quantitative economic historians.  They have 
regarded the claim that a £100 million program for three years would have cut 
unemployment by 500,000 as implausible. In particular, as Middleton (2010) noted, this is 
mainly because estimates of the multiplier have been lower than those of early Keynesians 
like Richard Kahn (1931), whose best guess was 1.88, and Keynes himself (1933), who 
favored a range of 2 to 3.  For example, Thomas (1981), whose estimate of the long-run 
multiplier was 1.44, concluded that by the third year real GDP would be increased by £120 
million and unemployment reduced by 329,000.  Dimsdale and Horsewood (1995) did 
support the idea of a relatively large multiplier but their more detailed treatment of the 
labor market led them to conclude that even though the Keynes-Henderson stimulus would 
have raised real GDP by £182-£202 million by year 3, unemployment would have been 
reduced only by 302,000-333,000.  Given that to reduce unemployment to ‘normal levels’ in 
1932 would have entailed cutting it by close to three million, there is a consensus that at 
that point there was no possibility of a Keynesian solution to unemployment. 
Based on an estimate of 0.8 for the government expenditure multiplier, we are considerably 
more pessimistic about the impact of the Keynes-Henderson program; Lloyd George would 
                                                          
28
 The increase in real GDP is based on the estimates in Mitchell et al. (2012). 
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have been hard pressed to cut unemployment by much more than 200,000.  So we share 
the consensus view that it would be unwise to have expected too much from fiscal stimulus 
in the early 1930s.  Moreover, insofar as there were risks that the viability of the cheap 
money policy could be threatened by announcing a fiscal stimulus which might trigger a rise 
in risk premia, our results suggest that this gamble was less worth taking than has hitherto 
been believed.29  
5. Conclusions 
We have developed a new approach to estimating the government expenditure multiplier 
for interwar Britain using quarterly data, time series econometrics, and defense news 
announcements.  This gives very different results from those found by previous researchers 
who may not have fully captured the crowding out of private by public expenditure.  Our 
estimates suggest a value in the range 0.3 to 0.8 after three years compared with at least 
1.2 in the earlier literature.  Evidently, our estimates for the multiplier suggest that there 
was less scope to use public works to raise GDP and reduce unemployment than has 
generally been supposed by economic historians and by the early Keynesians.  This means 
that we are in full agreement with earlier writers that ‘Lloyd George could not have done it’, 
i.e., that a £100 million pounds program of public works annually for three years would not 
have reduced unemployment by 500,000 but by 200,000 or less. 
Given the circumstances of the early 1930s, we think contemporaries were right to worry 
that a significant fiscal stimulus would have pushed interest rates up and undermined the 
cheap money policy which helped to promote recovery in Britain after 1932.  If there was 
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 Middleton (2010, p. 436) sets up the government’s policy options in exactly this way. 
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such a trade-off between using fiscal or monetary policy to stimulate the economy at that 
time, then our results tilt the balance further towards relying on monetary policy. 
Macroeconomists have become more aware that the magnitude of the multiplier may vary 
according to the state of the economy.30  In that respect, we conjecture that a small 
multiplier in interwar Britain may reflect the high ratio of public debt to GDP and the 
worries of private agents that increased government spending might imply large future 
taxes given the fragility of public finances. 
Nevertheless, we find that rearmament delivered a valuable, if limited, stimulus after 1935.  
Our estimate is that, in the absence of the rearmament program, real GDP in 1938 would 
have been, at most, 5 per cent lower.  It is important, however, that for such a large impact 
to play out would require a large private-sector response to news of massive future defense 
expenditure rather than coming from a big fiscal multiplier.  If a similar amount to that 
disbursed on defense had been spent on a temporary public works program in the mid 
1930s, then based on a multiplier of ≤ 0.8 the boost to real GDP would probably have been 
no more than a little over 3 per cent and the impact on unemployment would have been 
relatively modest. 
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 See, for example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Ilzetzki et al. (2010). 
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Table 1. Real GDP, Annual Growth Rates and Unemployment in the United Kingdom, 
1929-1938. 
 GDP  
(£mn. 1938 
prices) 
Real GDP 
 (1929 = 100) 
% change in 
GDP since last 
year 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
1929 4216 100 +2.4   8.0 
1930 4210   99.9  -0.1 12.3 
1931 3980   94.4  -5.5 16.4 
1932 4008   95.1 +0.7 17.0 
1933 4046   96.0 +0.9 15.4 
1934 4334 102.8 +7.1 12.9 
1935 4496 106.6 +3.7 12.0 
1936 4633 109.9 +3.1 10.2 
1937 4834 114.6 +4.3   8.5 
1938 4985 118.2 +3.1 10.1 
 
Sources: 
Real GDP at factor cost: Feinstein (1972,Table 5). 
Unemployment: Boyer and Hatton (2002).
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Table 2.  Defense News: Estimates of Changes in Net Present Value of Expected Defense 
Expenditure (£ million, 1938 prices). 
1920Q1  1927Q1  1934Q1  
1920Q2  1927Q2   +2.2 1934Q2  
1920Q3  1927Q3  1934Q3   +44.3 
1920Q4   +36.0 1927Q4  1934Q4  
1921Q1 +112.4 1928Q1  1935Q1  
1921Q2  1928Q2  1935Q2 +178.2 
1921Q3   -36.7 1928Q3  1935Q3  
1921Q4  1928Q4  1935Q4  
1922Q1  1929Q1  1936Q1 +160.0 
1922Q2  1929Q2  1936Q2  
1922Q3  1929Q3  1936Q3  
1922Q4   -10.9 1929Q4  1936Q4  
1923Q1  1930Q1  1937Q1 +393.0 
1923Q2   +72.4 1930Q2  1937Q2  
1923Q3  1930Q3  1937Q3  
1923Q4     -0.9 1930Q4  1937Q4  
1924Q1  1931Q1  1938Q1  
1924Q2   -22.1 1931Q2  +7.0 1938Q2   +98.8 
1924Q3  1931Q3  1938Q3   +29.1 
1924Q4  1931Q4  1938Q4  
1925Q1  1932Q1    
1925Q2  1932Q2 +52.0   
1925Q3  1932Q3    
1925Q4  1932Q4    
1926Q1  1933Q1    
1926Q2   +0.9 1933Q2    
1926Q3  1933Q3    
1926Q4  1933Q4    
 
Source: own calculations, see text. 
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Table 3.  Barro and Redlick Specification Estimates  
 1922Q1 to 1938Q4 1922Q1 to 1934Q4 
 (1)   
ty  
(2)  
ty  
constant –0.0062   [4.2] –0.0086 [4.2] 
1tnews  0.0325 [10.7] –0.0248 [1.4] 
2tnews  0.0179   [4.6] 0.1246 [3.9] 
32  tt GDPD  –0.1076   [3.0] –0.1354 [3.5] 
43  tt GDPD  –0.2544   [5.7] –0.4297 [5.8] 
43  tt GDPD  – –0.2221 [4.7] 
2R  0.19 0.12 
SE 0.0168 0.0208 
 
Note:  Figures in parentheses are robust t-ratios.  SE is the regression standard error.  The estimates 
for the ARCH(1) error specification for the equation in column (1) are ]5.297[1031.9ˆ 90
  and 
]2.4[7016.1ˆ1   and are ]0.241[1098.5
ˆ 9
0
  and ]7.3[0891.2ˆ1   for the equation in column 
(2). 
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Table 4.  Regression Estimates: Preferred Specification  
(a) Sample period: 1922Q1 to 1938Q4 
 (1) 
ty  
(2) 
td  
(3) 
tdnon  
(4) 
tn  
constant 0.0025   [2.6] – – 0.0127 [2.3] 
1tnews  0.0154   [3.5] – – – 
2tnews  0.0380 [12.2] – – – 
3tnews  – 0.9524 [3.4] – – 
4tnews  – 1.4360 [5.3] 0.3414 [1.4] –0.2016 [2.0] 
1 td  – –0.8194 [9.3] – – 
2 td  – –0.5053 [5.0] – – 
3 td  –0.0086   [2.7] –0.2587 [2.7] – – 
4 td  0.0062   [2.5] 0.2806 [3.3] – – 
1 tdnon  0.0095   [6.0] – –0.3989 [4.0] – 
2 tdnon  –0.0208   [8.6] – –0.2899 [2.8] – 
3 tdnon  –0.0166   [5.0] – –0.2672 [2.6] – 
4 tdnon  – – 0.5353 [5.7] – 
1 tn  –0.1376 [14.0] –– – –0.5373 [4.6] 
2 tn  – – – –0.2426 [2.2] 
3 tn  –0.1190 [11.4] – – – 
4 tn  –0.0417   [6.1] – – – 
2R  0.46 0.78 0.86 0.28 
SE 0.0143 0.1128 0.1056 0.0423 
 
Note:  .  Figures in parentheses are robust t-ratios. SE is the regression standard error.  The estimates 
for the ARCH(1) error specification for the equation in column (1) are ]0.322[1037.2ˆ 70
  and 
]6.5[5905.1ˆ1  . 
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Sample period: 1922Q1 to 1934Q4 
 (1) 
ty  
(2) 
td  
(3) 
tdnon  
(4) 
tn  
constant 0.0077   [5.7] – – 0.0112 [1.6] 
1tnews  –0.0198   [1.6] – – – 
2tnews  0.0833   [4.3] – – – 
3tnews  – 3.3568 [3.5] – – 
4tnews  – 2.3323 [3.5] 1.5458 [2.2] –0.4718 [1.5] 
1 td  – –0.8235 [7.8] –  
2 td  – –0.5645 [4.2] –  
3 td  –0.0047   [1.8] –0.3403 [2.7] –  
4 td  0.0108   [5.1] 0.2045 [2.1] –  
1 tdnon  0.0138 [15.2] – –0.4437 [3.9]  
2 tdnon  –0.0264   [9.1] – –0.3048 [2.6]  
3 tdnon  –0.0310   [8.0] – –0.2682 [2.3]  
4 tdnon  – – 0.5021 [4.8]  
1 tn  – – – –0.3682 [3.1] 
2 tn  –0.1739 [12.1] – – –0.2145 [1.7] 
3 tn  –0.1945 [21.7] – – – 
4 tn  –0.0282   [5.0] – – – 
2R  0.45 0.83 0.86 0.21 
SE 0.0172 0.1043 0.1156 0.0507 
 
Note:  Figures in parentheses are robust t-ratios. SE is the regression standard error.  The estimates 
for the ARCH(1) error specification for the equation in column (1) are ]9.244[1061.1ˆ 80
  and 
]7.2[9243.1ˆ1  .  
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Table 5.  Estimating the Effect of Government Expenditure on Private-Sector Spending 
 
 1922Q1 to 1938Q4 
1 tt GDPN  
1922Q1 to 1934Q4 
1 tt GDPN  
constant 0.0265 [3.6] 0.0266 [3.1] 
21  tt GDPN  0.2753 [3.5] 0.3342 [2.3] 
32  tt GDPN  –0.9327 [8.2] –1.0242 [8.6] 
43  tt GDPN  –0.1826 [2.6] –0.1144 [1.2] 
54  tt GDPN  –0.1767 [2.5] –0.1928 [2.2] 
21  tt GDPG  0.9017 [6.2] 0.9066 [4.9] 
32  tt GDPG  –0.8394 [4.7] –0.9516 [4.7] 
43  tt GDPG  –0.1494 [1.2] –0.1252 [0.8] 
54  tt GDPG  –0.3739 [3.3] –0.3974 [3.0] 
3tnews  –0.0435 [3.5] –0.1296 [1.5] 
4tnews  –0.0692 [3.8] 0.1286 [1.2] 
2R  0.95 0.95 
SE 0.0115 0.0121 
 
Note:   Figures in parentheses are robust t-ratios. SE is the regression standard error.   
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Table 6.  Simulated Impact of Defense News Shocks on Real GDP (£million, 1938 prices) 
 GDP Impact 
from Defense 
News 
 
Impact as % 
Real GDP 
 
Defense 
Expenditure 
1932Q1   0.56 0.06 27.92 
1932Q2   0.37 0.04 28.38 
1932Q3   1.19 0.12 28.03 
1932Q4   3.30 0.33 26.89 
1933Q1   3.38 0.34 30.34 
1933Q2   3.41 0.34 28.43 
1933Q3   3.56 0.35 28.22 
1933Q4   4.49 0.43 27.81 
1934Q1   5.08 0.48 34.76 
1934Q2   5.34 0.50 28.35 
1934Q3   5.17 0.48 29.59 
1934Q4   5.64 0.52 31.33 
1935Q1   7.37 0.68 36.25 
1935Q2   7.54 0.68 30.49 
1935Q3 10.24 0.91 32.91 
1935Q4 17.03 1.50 39.50 
1936Q1 17.85 1.56 44.78 
1936Q2 20.29 1.74 40.27 
1936Q3 27.18 2.30 43.69 
1936Q4 30.25 2.56 49.48 
1937Q1 32.06 2.69 61.14 
1937Q2 35.05 2.90 47.13 
1937Q3 52.50 4.31 58.35 
1937Q4 53.61 4.40 66.61 
1938Q1 54.40 4.46 89.45 
1938Q2 55.71 4.59 65.43 
1938Q3 63.86 5.26 92.52 
1938Q4 72.22 5.91 80.18 
    
Sources: own calculations, see text, and data appendix for GDP and defense expenditure 
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Figure 1 Defense news divided by lagged real GDP: 1920Q2-1938Q$. 
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Figure 2 Quarterly growth of real GDP: 1920Q2-1938Q$. 
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Figure 3 Defense news multipliers. 
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Figure 4 Simulated effect of defense news shocks on GDP using a five-year horizon. 
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Appendix 
We report in this appendix the data sources that we used for the econometric analysis together with 
the estimated coefficients on the control variables for equations (1) and (2). 
Data 
The data sources for the variables used in the regressions are as follows: 
Real GDP at 1938 prices: Mitchell et al. (2012, Table 2b). 
Government expenditure on goods and services and on defense: as reported in The Economist on a 
quarterly basis at current prices in the first issue of January, April, July and October each year, 
converted into 1938 prices using the retail price index from Capie and Collins (1983, Table 2.14).  
Before 1921Q2, defense expenditure was inferred using the annual total reported in Feinstein (1972, 
Table 33) allocated to quarters based on army numbers taken from BPP (1922, 1923) for years 
ending 30 September 1920 and 1921. 
Defense News:  derived as explained in Crafts (2012). 
Exports:  Capie and Collins (1983, Table 5.8) converted into 1938 prices. 
Tax Rate: total tax revenues/GDP from Middleton, Government versus the Market, Tables AI.1 and 
AI.2 
Unemployment:  Capie and Collins (1983, Table 4.5). 
Money Multiplier: M1/monetary base from Capie and Webber (1985, Table I.2).  Before 1922Q1 M1 
was estimated as M3/1.33 from Howson (1975, Appendix 1, Table 1). 
Yield on Consols: Capie and Webber (1985,Table III.10). 
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Table A1.  Control Variable Estimates from Equations (1) and (2). 
(a) Sample: 1922Q1 to 1938Q4 
 (1) (2) 
2 tex  0.0468   [5.9] 0.0530   [8.9] 
3 tex  0.0253   [5.9] – 
4 tex  –0.0167   [4.9] – 
3 tmm  0.0398   [6.7] 0.0412   [8.5] 
4 tmm  0.0818 [21.8] 0.0548   [9.6] 
1 ttax  –0.0112 [18.4] –0.0088 [13.2] 
1 tR  –0.0079   [4.6] –0.0155 [11.3] 
1tun  – –0.0039 [15.8] 
2tun  0.0014   [4.9] 0.0041 [17.1] 
3tun  –0.0008   [2.7] – 
 
 
(b) Sample: 1922Q1 to 1934Q4 
 
 (1) (2) 
2 tex  0.0442 [7.9] 0.0834 [25.5] 
3 tex  0.0234 [4.0] – 
4 tex  –0.0059 [1.4] – 
3 tmm  0.0332 [4.9] 0.0240   [5.2] 
4 tmm  0.0792 [8.1] 0.0274   [4.7] 
1 ttax  –0.0046 [8.3] –0.0064 [15.4] 
1 tR  –0.0011 [0.5] –0.0167 [17.1] 
1tun  – –0.0048 [16.3] 
2tun  0.0001 [0.4] 0.0048 [14.3] 
3tun  0.0006 [2.2] – 
 
Note: tex  is export growth, tmm  is the change in the money multiplier, ttax  is the change in 
the tax rate, tR  is the change in the consol yield, and tun  is the unemployment rate.  Figures in 
parentheses are robust t-ratios. 
 
